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PURE NASH EQUILIBRIA OF COORDINATION MATRIX GAMES
DAVID P. ROBERTS
DIVISION OF SCIENCE AND MATHEMATICS, UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA–MORRIS

Abstract. We give a simple formula for the chance that a random m-by-n coordination game has exactly k pure Nash equilibria and compare the payoffs at the
different equilibria.
Keywords: pure Nash equilibrium, coordination game
JEL classification: C72

1. Introduction
Stanford (1999) studied in this journal the number of pure Nash equilibria in random
m-by-n coordination games. In Section 2, we considerably sharpen Stanford’s main
results, getting a simple formula for the chance that a random m-by-n coordination
game has exactly k pure Nash equilibria. In Section 3, we complement our result by
discussing how the payoffs at the different equilibria are typically quite different from
one another.
Our mathematical setting throughout this letter involves a Player 1 choosing among
m strategies and a Player 2 choosing among n strategies. If Player 1 chooses his ith
strategy and Player 2 chooses his j th strategy then both players receive a return of aij .
Thus to give an m-by-n coordination game between Player 1 and Player 2 is to give the
m-by-n matrix A = (aij ). To avoid complications, we assume throughout that the game
is strict in the sense that all the aij are distinct. This allows us to also use the alternative
notation a(1), a(2), . . . , a(mn), where the a(r) are the aij listed in descending order.
A pure Nash equilibrium for A is a pair (i, j) such that aij is both the largest entry in
its row and the largest entry in its column. It will be convenient to refer to the number
aij itself as the pure Nash equilibrium. We can use such language without any ambiguity
because of our strictness assumption.
Clearly the largest entry a(1) is a pure Nash equilibrium. Equally clearly, optimal
coordinated play by Player 1 and 2 would result in this equilibrium being chosen. However, of course, our simple situation is part of a number of more complicated models of
economic behavior. The two players may not be in good communication. They may be
distrustful of one another. They may be playing repeated games, perhaps making their
choices via some evolutionary algorithm.
In all the situations just listed, the presence of other pure Nash equilibria can be
viewed as obstructions to a(1) being chosen. It is thus important to have a good understanding of the other pure Nash equilibria and their associated payoffs a(r); these topics
correspond to our Sections 2 and 3 respectively. For more on the economic importance
of coordination games and their Nash equilibria, we refer the reader to the first section
of Stanford’s letter.
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2. The number of pure equilibria
Clearly the pure Nash equilibria of a coordination game A depend on the entries aij
only through how they are ordered. Following Stanford, we consider random games
where the (mn)! possible orderings occur with equal frequency.
Let A be an m-by-n coordination game. Let N be its set of pure Nash equilibria.
For every subset S of N let W (S) be the smallest minor of A containing S. We call
a w-by-w minor full iff it arises in this way. Our terminology captures the fact that a
w-by-w minor of A contains ≤ w of A’s pure Nash equilibria, with equality iff A is full.
Our main statement has two parts. The two parts together refine Stanford’s main
results, as we’ll explain after the proof.
Theorem 1. Let em,n,k be the chance that a random m-by-n coordination game has
exactly k pure Nash equilibria. Then
  
m n k(m − 1)!(n − 1)!
.
(1)
em,n,k =
k
k
(m + n − 1)!
Let Em,n,w be the average number of full w-by-w minors in random m-by-n coordination
games. Then
  
m
n (m + n − w − 1)!w!
Em,n,w =
.
(2)
w
w
(m + n − 1)!
Proof. In general, suppose e0 , e1 , . . . , ed is a given finite sequence of numbers. Introduce
Pd
the polynomial f (x) = k=0 ek xk . Define a second sequence E0 , . . . , Ed by f (x) =
Pd
w
w=0 Ew (x − 1) . Comparing coefficients, one has
d  
X
k
Ew =
ek ,
(3)
w
k=w
d  
X
w
ek =
(−1)w−k Ew .
(4)
k
w=k

We say that the row vector E = (E0 , E1 , . . . , Ed ) is the Pascal transform of the row vector
e = (e0 , e1 , . . . , ed ) and that e is the inverse Pascal transform of E. Our terminology
reflects the fact that if one writes (3) in matrix form as E = eP , then P is lower triangular
with the lower triangle being exactly Row 0 through Row d of Pascal’s triangle.
For the proof of (1) and (2), we view m and n as fixed and both k and w as running
from 0 to d = min(m, n). For k = 0, both sides of (1) are 0. For w = 0, both sides of
(2) are 1; for on the left side, any m-by-n matrix A has exactly one 0-by-0 minor and
this minor certainly contains 0 Nash equilibria.
Our proof of (1) has three steps. Step 1 is to observe that the vector Em,n =
(1, Em,n,1 , . . . , Em,n,d ) is the Pascal transform of the vector em,n = (0, em,n,1 , . . . , em,n,d ).
Step 2 is to prove (2) by a direct argument. Step 3 is to apply a classical fact to prove
that the right side of (1) is the inverse Pascal transform of the right side of (2). The
three steps are completely independent of one another and can therefore be read in any
order.
Step 1. From the definition of full, it is clear that a game with k pure Nash equilibria
k
has w
full w-by-w minors. Combined with the definition (3), this observation proves
that Em,n is indeed the Pascal transform of em,n .
0
be the chance that a random m-by-n coordination game A satisfies
Step 2. Let Em,n,w
(*), a11 > a22 > · · · > aww , and (**), all w of these auu are pure Nash equilibria. Then
  
m
n
0
Em,n,w =
w!2 Em,n,w
.
(5)
w
w
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For, in general, contributions to Em,n,w
come from ai1 ,j1 > · · · > aiw ,jw , with each aiu ,ju

a Nash equilibrium. The factor m
w!
in
(5) comes from our focus on the special case
w
n
iu = u and the factor w w! similarly comes from our focus on the special case ju = u.
Now Conditions (*) and (**) on A can be reformulated as w independent conditions.
Namely the tth condition is that aw+1−t,w+1−t is the largest of the (m + n − t)t numbers
aij with indices satisfying 0 ≤ w − i ≤ t − 1 or 0 ≤ w − j ≤ t − 1. Thus one has
0
Em,n,w
=

w
Y

(m + n − w − 1)!
1
=
.
(m + n − t)t
w!(m + n − 1)!
t=1

(6)

Inserting (6) into (5) and canceling a w! gives (2).
Step 3. Let

−1
d
d
X
X
a,b
d b−a
k
a,b
Jd (x) = (−1)
Pda,b (2x − 1) =
ea,b
Ew
(x − 1)w .
k x =
d
w=0
k=0

Pda,b (y)

Here the
are the classically normalized Jacobi polynomials with parameters a
and b, while the Jda,b (x) are renormalized versions more suited to our context. Then

−1 


b−a
d+b
−1 − a − b − d
ea,b
=
,
k
d
d−k
k

−1 


b−a
−a − w − 1 −1 − a − b − d
a,b
Ew
=
,
d
d−w
w
from e.g. Equations
8.960 and 8.961.1 of Gradshteyn and Ryzhik (1994) and the general

−a
formula b = (−1)b a+b−1
. Then, treating the cases m ≥ n and n ≥ m separately,
b
−m−n,−1
one can check that e−m−n,−1
and Ew
simplify to the right sides of (1) and (2)
k
respectively, by direct cancelation of factorials. So the right side of (1) is indeed the
inverse Pascal transform of the right side of (2).

Stanford proves in his Theorem 1.1 that the expected number of pure Nash equilibria
is mn/(m + n − 1). He proves in his Theorems 1.2 and 1.3 results indicating that the
distribution about this mean is tight. He writes on page 31 that a more “complete
analysis” would be desirable, but is obstructed by “complications.” Equations (2) and
(3) with w = 1 say that the expected number of pure Nash equilibria is hki = Em,n,1 =
mn/(m + n − 1), recovering Stanford’s Theorem 1.1. Equations (2) and (3) now for
w ≤ 2 give the central variance of the number of pure Nash equilibria as
m(m − 1)n(n − 1)
2
hk 2 i − hki2 = (2Em,n,2 + Em,n,1 ) − (Em,n,1
)=
;
(m + n − 1)2 (m + n − 2)
this is a much sharper statement than the inequality in Stanford’s Theorem 1.2. The
full statement of our Theorem 1 is the desired complete analysis. In particular, it is
immediate from (1) that for fixed k, one has em,n,k → 0 as min(m, n) → ∞, and this is
enough to recover Stanford’s Theorem 1.3.
Remarkably, the quantities appearing in Theorem 1 also appear in the study of random games where the aij are chosen independently with respect to the Cauchy density
f (x) = 1/(π(x2 + 1)). Namely, according to Theorem 1 of Roberts (2004), em,n,k is
also the chance that the unique mixed Nash equilibrium of a Cauchy-random m-by-n
zero-sum game is k-by-k. Similarly, according now to Theorem 2 of Roberts (2004), for
w ≥ 1 the quantity Em,n,w is also the expected number of w-by-w mixed Nash equilibria
of a Cauchy-random m-by-n coordination game. The asymptotics of both em,n,k and
Em,n,w are studied at some length in Roberts (2004).
There is a second connection between the Em,n,w and mixed Nash equilibria. Namely
suppose given a matrix A. Redefine each a(r) to be bmn−r , with b > 1 an as yet
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unspecified number. Note that the order of the matrix entries is not changed in this
process, but as b gets large the preference for a given return a(r) over the next a(r + 1)
increases. We can prove that for b sufficiently large, the minors coming from mixed Nash
equilibria are exactly the full minors. So in this “strong preference limit,” (2) gives the
expected number of w-by-w mixed Nash equilibria.
3. Payoffs at pure equilibria
Let A[1], . . . , A[k] be the pure Nash equilibria of A in descending order. As explained
in Section 1, it is important to understand how much smaller than A[1] the other A[u]
are. There are two separate effects which can contribute to A[u] being much smaller than
A[1]. First, the a(1), a(2), . . . , can decrease rapidly. Second, in the equality A[u] = a(r),
one may have r larger than u.
To pursue the first effect, we consider probability densities f on the real line and
consider the real numbers aij drawn independently with respect to f . The strength of
the first effect depends on right tail of f . Any number of statements can be established
using the results in Chapter 10 of David and Nagaraja (2003). As an example including
the Cauchy density, suppose f (x) ∼ C/x2 as x → ∞, for some constant C > 0. Then
Rd
the chance that log(a(r)/a(r + 1)) is in [c, d] tends to r c e−rx dx as mn → ∞. In
particular, the asymptotic median value of a(r)/a(r + 1) is 21/r while the asymptotic
mean is infinite for r = 1 and equal to r/(r − 1) for r ≥ 2. Thus, in this heavy tail
setting, a(1) is very much preferred over a(2), which is still substantially preferred over
a(3), and so on.
To treat the second effect, let rm,n (u) be the average r in the equality A[u] = a(r), as
A ranges over games with at least u pure Nash equilibria. We have an exact formula for
rm,n (u) but it is too complicated to give economic insight. Instead we give two limiting
statements which can be established without using the whole formula:
lim rm,n (u)

n→∞

= u+

u−1
X
i=1

i
,
m−i


ru,u (u) log(2u) + γ
−
= 0.
lim
u→∞
u
2
In the second statement, γ ≈ 0.5772 is Euler’s constant. Each statement shows that
rm,n (u) can be quite a bit larger than u.


References
[1] David, H. A. and H. N. Nagaraja, 2003, Order statistics, third edition (Wiley).
[2] Gradshteyn, I. S. and I. M. Ryzhik, with A. Jeffrey, editor, 1994, Table of integrals, series, and
products, fifth edition (Academic Press).
[3] Roberts, D. P., 2004, Nash equilibria of Cauchy-random zero-sum and coordination matrix games,
submitted, 12 pages. Posted at http://cda.morris.umn.edu/~roberts
[4] Stanford, W., 1999, On the number of pure strategy Nash equilibria in finite common payoffs
games, Economics Letters 62, 29-34.

